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Court of Appeal  
 
Joint enterprise, murder and substantial injustice: the first successful appeal 
post-Jogee 
 
R v Crilly [2018] EWCA Crim 168 
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The applicant was a drug addict who supported his habit by burgling houses. In 2005, 
he was convicted of robbery and murder, after he and two others, Flynn and Gaffney, 
had broken into the flat of 71-year-old Mr Maduemezia. It was the appellant’s case 
that the group had sought to ascertain that the property was unoccupied by knocking 
on the door. When no one answered, they had assumed that Mr Maduemezia was out. 
Upon breaking-in, the men were surprised to find themselves in the presence of the 
occupier, who, hard of hearing, had not heard their knocks. 
The applicant stated that Flynn had demanded money from Mr Maduemezia and 
pushed him into a chair. The applicant and Gaffney searched the flat. When they 
returned empty handed, Flynn became furious and punched Mr Maduemezia in the 
face which caused him to fall onto the floor. The applicant, having helped the victim 
back up, left the flat and waited for the others outside. They joined him about ten 
minutes later, carrying a food blender. This they later sold. 
A neighbour discovered Mr Maduemezia’s body. He had died from a head injury 
caused by at least one blow of moderate force. Flynn was convicted of murder on the 
basis that he had inflicted the fatal punch with intent to kill or cause grievous bodily 
harm. The applicant was found guilty under joint enterprise principles. It was the 
prosecution’s case that he had continued to participate in the robbery when he must 
have foreseen that Flynn might cause Mr Maduemezia really serious bodily harm with 
intent.  
The applicant did not immediately challenge the safety of his conviction, having been 
(correctly) advised that, on the law as it then stood, he had no arguable grounds to 
appeal. After the change of law in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, he applied for an 
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extension of time (of 11 years and 3 months) and for leave to appeal against his 
murder conviction. To justify an appeal brought out of time, ‘substantial injustice’ 
must be demonstrated. Following R v Johnson and Others [2017] 1 Cr App R 12; 
[2016] EWCA Crim 1613 this requires the applicant to show that there is a 
sufficiently strong case that he would not have been convicted had the law as 
identified in Jogee been applied to his case. 
Held, allowing the appeal and quashing the conviction for murder, that ‘the case 
against the applicant was to all intents and purposes a case about his foresight’ (at 
[42]). There were but two factual findings the Court felt could be safely derived from 
the jury verdicts, namely (1) that he was guilty of robbery (crime A), and that (2) at 
the very least he foresaw that grievous bodily harm might be caused to the victim of 
the robbery in which he nonetheless continued to participate (crime B) (at [39]). 
Whilst foresight may be evidence of intent, the evidence against the applicant was not 
so strong as to allow for a safe and fair inference that a Jogee-compliant jury would 
have found the requisite intent to cause grievous bodily harm (at [42]): as the Court 
noted, ‘he was not accused of intending or foreseeing any violence’ (at [40]) when he 
first entered the victim’s flat; ‘he was not accused of inflicting the violence’ (at [40]) 
and (although the trial judge’s steps to verdict raised this as an alternative to 
foresight) ‘he was not accused of intending to cause grievous bodily harm’ (at [40]); 
there was only a very short time between the discovery of the occupier and the 
progression from what was supposed to be a burglary to a robbery. The fatal attack 
was neither sustained nor savage. In fact, it was quite possible that death had been 
caused by just ‘a push and a punch’ (at [40]). The evidence thus put the applicant’s 
case ‘between the middle to lower end of the Johnson spectrum’ (at [41]) designed to 
assist the Court in determining the strength of an inference of participation with 
intention to cause really serious bodily harm. The Court concluded that Jogee-
compliant directions would have made a difference; ‘substantial injustice’ was made 
out, and the conviction was found to be unsafe (‘for very similar reasons’ (at [43])). 
Commentary 
Crilly is the first post-Jogee appeal in which an applicant has succeeded in 
demonstrating substantial injustice and had his murder conviction accordingly 
vacated. The judgment was not immediately available (so as not to prejudice the 
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appellant’s retrial at Manchester Crown Court at which he pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter) and its publication had been eagerly awaited. It was hoped that the 
decision would be indicative of a lowering of the high threshold test as expounded in 
R v Johnson and Others [2017] 1 Cr App R 12; [2016] EWCA Crim 1613 at [21]. At 
the least it was hoped (in view of the Court’s avowed efforts to deter ‘totally 
unmeritorious’ applications for leave to appeal, see R v James [2018] EWCA 285) the 
case would provide prospective applicants with further guidance on what is needed to 
demonstrate ‘substantial injustice’ in out-of-time appeals. Now that the judgment is in 
the public domain, it is evident that the Court remains faithful to its approach in 
Johnson and the ‘spectrum’ test for inferring intention from evidence including 
foresight. Interestingly though, the Court was prepared to put greater trust in the 
applicant’s version of events than it did in any of the Johnson appeals. 
None of the accused had carried a weapon, and the Court of Appeal places much 
emphasis on the fact that the present case involved neither a sustained nor savage 
attack, with the victim dying quite possibly as the result of just one ‘push and a 
punch’ [40]. This put the case fairly low on the Johnson spectrum of sample cases, 
although not quite at the bottom, as the Court acknowledged. The circumstances also 
set it apart it from other joint enterprise murders, which typically feature weapons, 
vicious, if not necessarily prolonged, attacks at the hands of several parties and the 
infliction of multiple injuries in circumstances where some act of violence was 
anticipated from the outset. 
In other words, the outcome in Crilly is not so much owed to a softened approach to 
finding ‘substantial injustice’ as to the particulars of the case (as the Court felt 
‘obliged to take them’ [41]). Decisive was that the ‘most likely’ and ‘fairest’ fact 
scenario concerned an unarmed burglary of a seemingly unoccupied flat that had 
surprisingly and rapidly ‘gone wrong’ because the precautions taken did not work in 
the case of a householder whose hearing was impaired, turning a non-violent, non-
dangerous property offence into a robbery and (one-punch) murder. Use of force was 
limited and of moderate severity. 
Much is also made of the fact that the prosecution, in going after Mr Crilly, had nailed 
its flags rather firmly to the ‘foresight’ pole of liability. The Court goes to some 
lengths highlighting the evidence that suggests Mr Crilly had at no point intended that 
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serious harm be caused to the victim. To this effect, it cites extensively from the trial 
transcript (in particular, from the applicant’s cross-examination and the judge’s 
summing up of the evidence given by him). The defence conceded, and the Court 
duly notes, that the trial judge’s steps to verdict left it to the jury to find – within the 
same step – that the accused either intended or foresaw the infliction of grievous 
bodily harm. However, the tenor of the judgment is such that the most plausible 
inference to be drawn from the jury’s verdict, read against the accusations as 
advanced at trial, is that they returned the guilty verdict on a theory of foresight. 
The holistic view thus taken is consistent with the approach in the Johnson appeals 
where, despite routes to verdict that were often drafted with a clear focus on foresight, 
the Court of Appeal saw fit to conclude that a properly instructed jury, aware of the 
evidence as presented at trial, would have found intention. Crilly confirms that 
proving ‘substantial injustice’ is not about proving that the trial judge’s directions to 
the jury were flawed in light of Jogee, but about demonstrating that the accusation 
was built on foresight all along. Prospective applicants will need to look closely at the 
prosecution case, as well as the dynamics and nuances of the trial (see James [2018] 
EWCA 285). It will not suffice to focus one’s efforts on the trial judge’s summing up, 
the steps to verdict and related jury directions. But Crilly suggests that if it can be 
shown that an applicant’s case was in essence about foresight, the odd reference to 
intention might not prove fatal to his case (and vice versa, see Johnson). 
It was anticipated that post-Jogee appeals would centre on the notion of ‘conditional’ 
intent (as, indeed, was the case in Burton and Hall [2016] EWCA Crim 1613, for 
example). Against this background, it is interesting to note that the judgment in Crilly 
does not contain a single mention of conditional intent, even though prosecution 
counsel had submitted that Crilly’s was a case where it ‘was understood by the 
participants that if any resistance was offered sufficient force would be used to render 
him incapable of resistance and that would include force with the intention of causing 
grievous bodily harm’ [34]. The absence of ‘conditional intent’ language is welcome, 
for, as I have argued elsewhere (B. Krebs, Accessory liability: persisting in error 
(2017) CLJ 76 (1) 7-11), the terminology is a red herring. It may of course be reading 
too much into a decision that did not proceed on the basis of prosecution counsel’s 
take on the facts, but if the avoidance of the term ‘conditional intent’ was in any sense 
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deliberate, then this aspect of Crilly may well indicate a welcome retreat from one of 
the more problematic aspects of the decision in Jogee. 
A final point to note is that the judgment confirms that the same considerations that 
inform the assessment on substantial injustice inform the decision on the safety of the 
conviction. The Court speaks to both points separately (as it did in Johnson), but deals 
with the safety issue in the briefest of terms, referring back to its analysis on 
substantial injustice (‘for very similar reasons’ [43]). In out-of-time appeals, it all 
comes down to the strength of the applicant’s argument that Jogee would have made a 
difference to the jury’s verdict.  
Beatrice Krebs 
School of Law, University of Reading 
 
